Africa’s arc of autocracy exacts a substantial human and economic cost

Last week, Tanzania held an election not worthy of the name. The leader of the opposition, Tundu Lissu, has been on trial for treason because he dared criticise the conduct of the election. His party, Chadema, was barred from participating.

On election day, Tanzanians showed their disapproval by staying away from voting and taking to the streets to protest. Hundreds are believed to have been killed or injured at the hands of security forces. The protests continue, as does the violence.

Tanzania, which promised reform and a competitive political system in the early days of President Samia Hassan’s rule, has effectively reverted to a one-party state; the president “won” the election with more than 97% of the vote. This hands Samia, who took power in 2021 after the death of her predecessor, a five-year term to govern a country of 68 million people where the average per capita income is, at $1,120, more than 40% less than the continental average and less than 10% of the global benchmark.

This poll follows last year’s election in neighbouring Mozambique to its south, where the result, which lacked credibility, led to a mass uprising that was also put down by brutal security force action.

To the north in Uganda, the opposition leader, Dr Kizza Besigye, is being tried by a military tribunal after being illegally detained and renditioned from Kenya. Uganda’s octogenarian president, who has been in power since 1986, is seeking another term in an upcoming January election. Across East Africa, Gen Z are crying foul over the empty promises and corruption by the ruling political class.

In the Sahel, military governments rule in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan, their spread encouraged by external meddling.

In Madagascar, the chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which Tanzania is a founding member, President Andry Rajoelina, was removed in October after widespread Gen Z protests. Although the African Union moved quickly to condemn what it described as a “coup”, the SADC response to implement its own protocols to reinstate civilian rule has been glacial.

Yet the seeds were sown a long time before, with Rajoelina having prevailed in the flawed 2023 election, a process that SADC failed to criticise. His fall now not only shows that nodding approval by African peers offers scant protection against the eruption of internal pressures, but also discredits further those same institutions when they do.

According to the 2025 Freedom House report, “Africa’s democratic future stands at a critical juncture. Progress toward a freer and more equitable continent will depend on three key factors: political will, grassroots civic engagement and sustained international support.”

The cost

The human cost of this widening arc of autocracy is substantial, with countless lives lost as security forces protect incumbent regimes against electoral outcomes and mass protests.

There is also an economic cost. The wave of authoritarianism threatens to stall a promising improvement in foreign direct investment over the last several years. Investors require certainty, lowered risk and the rule of law, all of which are threatened by repressive regimes that undermine democracy.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where the average income is shrinking in real terms, reflecting a failure of economic growth to keep pace with demographic change and the underpinning politics.

For all of the blather about the benefits of a big man (or woman) in running African states, there is an empirical correlation between standards of democracy and economic performance. Those countries, for instance, classified by Freedom House as having “free” political systems in sub-Saharan Africa — Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles and South Africa (10 countries) — enjoyed in 2024 an average per capita income of $5,542. The remainder, deemed “partly free” (15) or “unfree” (23), averaged a third of that number.

This is one reason why most Africans support democracy.

In its 2024 survey, a leading continental research organisation, Afrobarometer, found that: “Two-thirds (66%) of Africans say they prefer democracy to any other system of government, and large majorities reject one-man rule (80%), one-party rule (78%), and military rule (66%).”

Yet, only 45% of Africans think their countries are mostly or completely democratic, and only 37% say they are satisfied with the way democracy works.

There are countries where democratic practices are improving. In Zambia, which was in the grip of a populist leadership, the jailed opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema, successfully contested elections and has been implementing democratic and economic reforms. These exemplars should not only be celebrated by Western donors, but also supported and consolidated.

In South Africa, the governing African National Congress (ANC), dominant since 1994, suffered an electoral shock in 2024, losing its majority and entering into a coalition with the opposition Democratic Alliance.

And in Senegal, Ghana, Malawi, Lesotho and my own country, Botswana, governments have changed hands peacefully following hotly contested elections.

But these are exceptions. The decline of global interest in fostering and preserving democracy is allowing an ageing elite to keep itself in power with impunity. While the world looks away, in many African countries, elections are rigged, the opposition is silenced, the media is targeted, and the internet is turned on and off according to the whims of the ruling powers.

This is a moment for leadership in ensuring a return to real democracy where voters choose freely and governments enforce the rule of law and protect human rights. Such leadership is distinguishable by cool heads intent on de-escalating the situation in ushering in a new, democratic order.

As Tanzania is demonstrating, the youth of Africa will no longer tolerate sham elections masquerading as democratic contests. After all, development depends on getting the politics right. DM